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Abstract 
 
In two experiments, I investigated whether providing accuracy feedback on recognition 
memory tests affects discriminability of encoded targets from lures. The primary hypothesis was 
that feedback is a source of criterion noise which leads to lower discriminability. Additionally, it 
was predicted that separate sources of criterion noise might have additive effects. In both 
experiments, the presence of feedback was manipulated within-subjects. In Experiment 1, 
participants completed two recognition tests in which they made either “old/new” decisions or 
responded using an 8-point confidence scale. Feedback lowered discriminability for both 
response type conditions, although a slightly larger deleterious effect was observed in the 
“old/new” response condition.  Whether people responded either with “old/new” decisions 
versus on an 8-point confidence scale had no effect on discriminability. In Experiment 2, I 
manipulated the strength of study items whereby half of the items were studied once (weak) and 
the other half were studied four times (strong). At test, these targets were intermixed with an 
equal number of lures. Additionally, the presence of color cues indicating the expected strength 
of test items was varied between-subjects. Feedback decreased discriminability, although this 
was primarily for the strong items. The presence of color cues marking expected strength had no 
effect on discriminability. Taken together, these results suggest that feedback has a deleterious 
effect on recognition discriminability and that this may result via feedback introducing criterion 
noise into the recognition decision.
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Introduction 
Null effects of corrective test feedback on discriminability of studied from nonstudied 
items dominate the recognition memory literature. Feedback is generally unhelpful to 
discriminability when using continuous recognition (Estes & Maddox, 1995), under 
manipulations of base rates (Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Kantner & Lindsay, 2010; Selmeczy & 
Dobbins, 2013), memory strength (Verde & Rotello, 2007; Hicks & Starns, 2014), with older 
adults (Jennings & Jacoby, 2003), or with exotic stimuli such as complex melodies or paintings 
(Lindsay & Kantner, 2011). These results are somewhat surprising given that we might expect 
feedback to improve discriminability in several possible ways, such as allowing people to adapt a 
more optimal response criterion (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010) or by enhancing metacognitive 
monitoring of test stimuli (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). Some formal models of signal detection 
theory (SDT) rely explicitly on the integration of feedback and stimulus representations for 
making recognition decisions. For example, Turner, Van Zandt, and Brown (2011) proposed that 
when feedback is present, it can help improve recognition performance by allowing people to 
update their information regarding both signal and noise distributions. 
Although most researchers that have investigated the effects of feedback on recognition 
memory have typically noted no difference in discriminability for participants in control or 
feedback conditions, few, if any, have considered feedback to be a source of harm on recognition 
judgments. For example, Kantner and Lindsay (2010) conducted four experiments expecting a 
positive feedback effect but instead found three null effects and a significant negative effect of 
feedback in Experiment 2. They also noted that in all their experiments, discriminability was 
numerically lower in the feedback conditions. Kantner and Lindsay (2010) dismissed the 
possibility that their lack of positive effects was due to a Type II error in their study because 
2 
 
there was no trend for feedback to improve discriminability. Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) also 
dismissed the possibility of a Type II error, noting that their pattern of results did not display a 
trend toward feedback improving recognition sensitivity. However, neither study entertained the 
possibility that with sufficient statistical power, feedback may actually have a negative effect on 
performance. 
One plausible explanation is that introducing feedback may harm recognition via 
criterion noise. According to Benjamin, Diaz, and Wee’s (2009) noisy decision theory of signal 
detection (ND-TSD), criterion noise is introduced into recognition decisions via two 
mechanisms: the maintenance and updating of decision criteria. Both of these processes place an 
encumbrance on memory, which can subsequently lead to poorer recognition performance 
(Benjamin et al., 2009). Incorporating feedback into recognition decisions can easily be thought 
of as a way to promote appropriate updating and placement of response criteria. In fact, using 
feedback to better control criterion placement, rather than to influence discriminability, is often 
the primary reason that feedback is applied (e.g., Verde & Rotello, 2007). Thus, the primary goal 
of this study is to assess whether or not corrective feedback at test can introduce criterion noise 
leading to a decrement in memory discriminability. In the next few sections I first discuss a 
signal detection framework for recognition memory decisions. Next, I present evidence that 
feedback appears to be detrimental to recognition discriminability. Finally, I discuss how 
feedback may be viewed as causing criterion noise (or criterion variance).  
Signal Detection Theory 
Signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), has 
provided a successful framework in which to understand recognition memory. Consider a typical 
laboratory recognition study in which people study a list of words and take a test that contains a 
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mixture of studied and non-studied words. According to SDT, these two types of test items can 
be represented as separate distributions that vary on the singular dimension of familiarity or 
memory strength. Studied items comprise the target (signal + noise) distribution and sit farther to 
the right of the lure distribution (noise only). This is depicted below in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical target and lure distributions plotted on an axis of memory strength with 
stronger items in memory farther to the right. The vertical line labeled “C” represents an optimal 
criterion. 
 
 
Because memory is not perfectly veridical and people come into the laboratory with some 
pre-existing level of familiarity with all test items (at least when they are known words), these 
distributions overlap to some degree. This overlap requires that people set a criterion on this axis 
of memory strength, which is essentially a threshold by which test items are judged. This 
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criterion is often assumed to be fixed throughout the entire test (e.g., Stretch & Wixted, 1998). 
Importantly, most applications of SDT to recognition memory assume that unlike noise imparted 
by the test stimuli, there is no decision noise introduced by the criterion itself. That is, criterion 
variance equals zero (Green & Swets, 1966). If a test item exceeds this criterion it will be called 
“old” otherwise it will be called “new.” Items correctly called “old” are denoted as hits and those 
incorrectly called “old” are false alarms, the proportions of which can be used to calculate an 
overall hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate (FAR). These measures can be used to further define 
recognition performance by calculating a measure of discriminability (d’) which indexes the 
distance between the peaks of the signal and noise distributions in standardized units. 
Additionally, various measures of response bias and/or criterion placement can be calculated 
which represents either a person’s overall tendency to call test items “old” or to estimate the 
point along the familiarity axis at which a criterion sits.  The ideal observer will set a criterion 
that maximizes the HR and minimizes the FAR. 
How Does Feedback Affect Recognition Discriminability? 
The vast majority of studies have found either a null or negative effect of feedback on 
recognition memory discriminability. Some of the earliest research suggesting a feedback-
induced improvement came from Titus (1973) who had participants study CVC trigrams and 
take a recognition test in which he manipulated the presence of feedback at test as well as 
participants’ awareness of the base-rates of test items. For all subjects, only 20% of test items 
were old. This proportion of test items requires that people set a very conservative criterion in 
order to be most optimal. Titus analyzed HRs and FARs across the 75-item test in 3 blocks and 
found that when people were unaware of the base-rates of test items but received feedback, a 
conservative shift in criterion was observed as participants’ HRs and FARs decreased across 
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blocks, although the decrease in the FAR was most apparent. Statistically, neither prior 
knowledge of the probability that a test item was studied nor feedback affected recognition 
discriminability. However, d’ values I estimated from the reported HRs and FARs (based on an 
equal variance assumption) suggest that feedback helped improve performance overall, most 
notably when subjects had no knowledge about the probability of target items being old (i.e., an 
improvement from 1.61 to 1.97). This is what would be expected when criterion placement is 
nonoptimal in the control condition. The results also suggested an improvement in d’ when 
subjects were informed about the target probability, as performance increased from 1.61 in the 
control condition to 1.84 with the additional instruction.   
An early study by Clark and Greenberg (1971) suggests that the presence of feedback (or 
knowledge of results) harms recognition memory. Following the learning of 18 CVC trigrams, 
participants took 3 successive blocks old/new recognition tests. In each block, the same 18 
trigrams were the targets and a unique set of 12 trigrams was used as lures. Averaged over the 
blocks, d’ was 1.30 for the no-feedback group and 1.02 for the feedback group. It should be 
noted that this main effect was obtained in the context of interactions with other variables, 
including performance across blocks (1 through 3) and another factor of induced anxiety during 
the test procedure.  
This line of research perplexingly remained at a standstill over 20 years until Estes and 
Maddox (1995) studied the effects of feedback using a modified continuous recognition 
paradigm. In their paradigm, a set of stimuli was studied initially and people were instructed to 
call each item on this list “new.” After this phase, stimuli were continuously introduced in a 
hybrid learning/testing procedure. Each item was presented for an “old/new” decision in 
different testing blocks. Within each block, three types of items occurred: brand new items, items 
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from the initial study list, and items repeated from the prior block. Items from the study list and 
those repeated from prior blocks are considered targets. Brand new items in each block are 
considered lures. This stands in contrast to the more common procedure in which people study a 
set of items in a learning phase that is entirely distinct from the testing phase. They manipulated 
stimulus type between-subjects such that participants studied random digits, letter trigrams, or 
words. Feedback was also manipulated across participants along with the base-rates of test items 
whereby either 67% or 33% of the test items were old. Participants were unaware of the base-
rate manipulation. Across two experiments, marginally significant positive feedback effects were 
found for digit and letter stimuli. For the word stimuli, the presence of feedback again exerted no 
effect of discriminability, though there was a numerical benefit for those receiving feedback, 
particularly in Experiment 2. Regarding response bias, participants appropriately adopted either a 
liberal or conservative “old”-saying bias for the 67% and 33% old conditions when feedback was 
present, although feedback did not significantly impact subjects’ criterion for words (Estes & 
Maddox, 1995).  As with the Titus (1973) study, feedback influenced criterion-setting in this 
study by getting people to shift to a criterion placement more consistent with the base rates of the 
target and lure items and seemed to nominally improve discriminability. However, the results of 
this study should interpreted cautiously for two reasons. First, few subjects were tested in each 
condition, which limits both statistical power and generalizability. Second, the use of the hybrid 
continuous recognition paradigm makes it unclear whether feedback is impacting processes at 
encoding or retrieval.  
Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) included feedback with recognition tests in order to assess 
whether participants could dynamically shift their criterion when different base-rates of old items 
covaried with a particular study location. In Experiment 3, participants completed 4 study-test 
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blocks in which they received feedback in either the first two test blocks or the last two.  They 
found that the presence of feedback and awareness of the base-rate manipulations were necessary 
for participants to appropriately shift their decision criteria. They also found that when feedback 
was given for the first two test blocks, discriminability was best in the first block and 
subsequently dropped off for the other three blocks. For participants who received feedback on 
the last two test blocks, discriminability was consistent across on blocks 1 and 2 and declined 
when they received feedback for blocks 3 and 4. It is difficult to ascertain the overall influence of 
feedback across these conditions, because explicit d’ values were not presented separately for 
each block within each condition, but feedback was associated with criterion shifting.  
Likewise, Verde and Rotello (2007) also found that the presence of feedback was needed 
in order for participants to optimally shift their criterion for test items that varied in memory 
strength. Although they did not manipulate feedback within a particular experiment, their 
findings across two experiments are noteworthy. In both Experiments 2 & 5, participants studied 
a list of words in which some were studied once (weak condition) and some words were studied 
four times (strong condition) and took a recognition test comprised of targets and lures from each 
item class of items. No participants received feedback in Experiment 2 and all participants in 
Experiment 5 received trial-by-trial accuracy feedback. Otherwise the procedures in these 
experiments were identical. Although a criterion shift was observed only in the presence of 
feedback (Exp. 5), discriminability was numerically better for both strong and weak items when 
feedback was absent (Verde & Rotello, 2007). This study is somewhat unusual in that the strong 
and weak items were tested in a particular sequence, with 40 strong items and 40 lures in the first 
test block and the 40 weak items and lures in the last test block. Feedback in Experiment 5 
prompted people to decrease the HR first (strong) testing block relative to Experiment 2, leaving 
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the FAR relatively unaffected. In addition, feedback increased both the HR and FAR in the 
second (weak) testing block, leaving discriminability only slightly lowered in the feedback 
experiment. Of course, one drawback is that feedback is being compared across experiments, 
rather than being manipulated within a single experiment.   
Feedback was also examined in a study by Han and Dobbins (2008) who were interested 
in whether people could shift their criterion without manipulations of memory strength or base-
rates of test items and without participants’ awareness of test manipulations. In Experiment 1, 
participants completed 4 study-test cycles as in Rhodes & Jacoby (2007) and corrective feedback 
was given in 2 of the 4 blocks. However, unlike Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) discriminability was 
the same for feedback and no-feedback blocks. Experiments 2 & 3 introduced two types of false 
positive feedback in order to see if participants would adjust their criterion in response to the 
feedback.  Indeed, participants were able to use the feedback to shift their criterion without 
changes in discriminability. However, both of these latter experiments lacked a no-feedback 
group so the impact of the different types of feedback on discriminability could not be assessed.  
This limitation was addressed in a follow-up study in which two study-test blocks that 
included different false feedback manipulations preceded two additional blocks in which no 
feedback was given (Han & Dobbins, 2009). Again, the authors were primarily interested in 
participants’ ability to incorporate feedback in order to shift their decision criterion. Criterion 
shifts were readily observed in both experiments while discriminability was either unaffected by 
presence of feedback (Exp. 1) or declined across blocks (Exp. 2; Han & Dobbins, 2009).  This 
finding echoes that of Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) who found that when feedback was present in 
the first two study-test blocks, discriminability was best in the first block and declined 
afterwards. One potential limitation of this study is that Han and Dobbins (2009) did not 
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counterbalance the order in which participants received feedback, as blocks with feedback 
always came before no-feedback blocks.  
Some of the most comprehensive work recently that has examined how feedback affects 
recognition memory is that of Kantner and Lindsay (2010). They were interested in whether 
feedback could enhance discriminability when participants completed a single study phase 
followed by a single test. They manipulated feedback between-subjects and across four 
appreciably distinct experiments found null feedback effects in three of them. However, in 
Experiment 2 in which they also manipulated the base rates of test items, feedback significantly 
lowered discriminability.  
These null effects led the authors in a later study to consider whether the stimuli used in a 
recognition paradigm would affect whether or not feedback was helpful. Specifically, in a 
multitude of experiments, Lindsay and Kantner (2011) examined if feedback could enhance 
recognition for complex stimuli such as Korean melodies, famous paintings, and verses of 
poetry. For Korean melodies, two experiments yielded a small but significant positive effect of 
feedback. In contrast, two conceptual replications of these experiments again using Korean 
melodies produced null effects of feedback. In one replication, the authors manipulated both 
feedback and recognition responses whereby participants make either “yes/no” decisions or 
respond on a 6-point confidence scale. Discriminability was numerically lower in the feedback 
condition, indicating no benefit from feedback. For the experiments using either famous 
paintings or poetry, all of them with the exception of one of the poetry studies again resulted in a 
null effect of feedback. These results were found in concert with a variety of other manipulations 
such as participants’ motivation, test format (yes/no or rating scale response), orientation tasks, 
and study list presentation (human or robot voices). Appropriately, the authors warn caution 
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when considering the small positive effects found in this study as 13 of the 16 experiments 
resulted in null effects. 
Another recent examination of feedback in recognition memory was by Hicks & Starns 
(2014) who were interested in delineating the circumstances under which within-list strength-
based criterion shifts could be facilitated by manipulating test composition. Similarly to Verde 
and Rotello (2007), memory strength was manipulated via study repetitions whereby weak items 
were studied only once and strong items studied four times. Tests were comprised of 80 items 
that had an equal number of strong targets and lures as well as an equal number of weak targets 
and lures. In some conditions, the lures were designated as strong and weak only by  a color cue, 
setting up the expectation that participants would treat them differently based on their expected 
strength (i.e., in being compared with either strong or weak target items in the same color). In 
each of their first two experiments, they manipulated the presence vs. absence of this color cue 
marking, with the prediction that color marking should enable criterion shifting between strong 
and weak test blocks, whereas the lack of such marking would not.  Test items were presented in 
strong and weak blocks, the length of which was varied between-subjects. Additionally, 
feedback was not given in Experiment 1, but all participants in Experiment 2 received corrective 
feedback. Results indicated that both the presence of color cues and the presence of feedback 
independently harmed discriminability (Hicks & Starns, 2014).  
Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) explored the interplay between metacognitive monitoring 
and feedback using cues about the probability of a given test item being old or new. The 
probability cues consisted of indications prior to each test item about its likelihood of being old, 
with either a “likely old” or “likely new” statement. Some trials were preceded by these cues and 
other trials were not. In their first experiment, these cues were correct 75% of the time. Feedback 
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was manipulated between subjects. Selmeczy and Dobbins predicted that optimal criterion shifts 
and better discriminability would result for cued versus uncued trials and that feedback would 
help people adopt appropriate criteria. In both experiments, participants made “old/new” 
decisions followed by a confidence judgment. These confidence judgments were later correlated 
with recognition accuracy to produce a measure of metacognitive monitoring. Overall, 
discriminability was better in cued trials but feedback did not improve discriminability across the 
board nor did it selectively help only the cued trials. Although they only presented analyses that 
are collapsed across feedback groups, as feedback did not yield a significant effect, the authors 
mentioned two findings of importance. First, numerically the feedback had a negative effect. 
Second, the worst discriminability was observed on cued trials when feedback was present 
(Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). In Experiment 2, they manipulated cue validity in which test items 
were preceded by a screen that correctly indicated the cues given were correct either 65% or 85% 
of the time. Again, they replicated their results from Experiment 1 such that feedback did not 
improve performance selectively or overall and that discriminability was best for cued trials. 
Interestingly, in both experiments the metacognitive monitoring scores were lower for those in 
feedback conditions (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). This suggests that feedback might introduce 
some uncertainty into the recognition decision that is not present for those who receive no 
feedback. 
Null Effects or Type II Errors? 
Much of the foregoing analysis is summarized below in Table 1 as a listing of feedback-
related effect sizes from prior work.  
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Table 1. Negative effects of feedback on recognition discriminability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this table, I included only those estimates in which effect size was reported or could be 
reasonably estimated. Titus (1973) did not include d’ values or estimates of variability for them  
Estes and Maddox (1995) did not report any measures of variability for their reported d’ values, 
and only reported that F values were less than one in their ANOVA models examining the 
influence of stimulus type and feedback on d’. Hence the effect size for these experiments could 
not be reasonably estimated. It is important to note these absences from Table 1, because they 
also represent the only cases in which at least nominal positive feedback effects have been 
reported. Additionally, the Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) study did not report feedback vs. no-
feedback conditions in enough detail to reasonably estimate an effect size. The descriptions of 
their analyses imply that feedback either had a true null effect or perhaps a slight negative one. 
The remaining entries in Table 1 suggest an overall trend for negative influences of feedback 
when there are any above-zero effect sizes. Only the no-stress condition from the Clark and 
Greenberg (1971) study was included in this table, because it is most comparable to the other 
listed studies and to the experiments reported later. 
Although most of the findings regarding feedback were not statistically significant as 
reported in their respective publications, the range of effect sizes in Table 1 is considerable, with 
Study Experiment Sample Size Cohen’s d 
Kantner & Lindsay (2010) Exp. 1 46 .40 
 Exp. 2 71 .58 
 Exp. 3 43 .27 
 Exp. 4 77 .28 
Lindsay & Kantner (2011) All 16 538 .03 
Clark & Greenberg (1971) Exp. 1 30 .17 
Verde & Rotello (2007) Exps. 2 & 5 53 .35 
Han & Dobbins (2008) Exp. 1 16 .00 
Hicks & Starns (2014) Exps. 1 & 2 596 .26 
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some studies finding a true null effect size (Han & Dobbins, 2008) up to a medium-to-large 
effect size showing a decline in discriminability (Cohen’s d = .53) in Kantner & Lindsay’s 
(2010) study. Using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), Figure 2 displays the 
sample sizes needed to produce a significant negative influence of feedback for various levels of 
statistical power for a within-subjects manipulation assuming the following parameters: 
population effect size of Cohen’s d = .30, an estimated population correlation between repeated 
measures of ρ = .503 derived from pilot data, and a Type I error rate of .05.  
 
 
Figure 2. Sample size requirements for a given level of a prior statistical power to detect an 
influence of feedback using a within-subjects design assuming a population effect size of 
Cohen’s d = .30 and a population correlation between repeated measures of ρ = .503. Type I 
error rate equals .05. 
 
When power is set at .80 (i.e., 80%), a within-subjects manipulation of feedback would 
require a total sample size of 90 participants, whereas a between-subjects manipulation of 
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feedback would require 352 participants. Note that the Hicks and Starns (2014) between-subjects 
comparison of feedback versus no feedback involved over 500 subjects. Although significant 
results with large effect sizes have been found with smaller samples (e.g., Kantner & Lindsay, 
2010), this illustrates the point that although noteworthy effects of feedback might exist, they can 
be difficult to detect as significant depending on the experimental design and manipulations 
used. 
Noisy Decision Theory of Signal Detection 
The overall results from Table 1 suggest very small effect sizes associated with positive 
influences of feedback, but small-to-moderate effects sizes in the negative direction. On average, 
the data suggest that feedback is likely more harmful than helpful. Given the assumption that 
feedback might be doing some harm, one must consider a theoretical basis for it. One candidate 
process is increased criterion variability caused by feedback. The noisy decision theory of signal 
detection (ND-TSD; Benjamin et al., 2009) is a recent example highlighting the possibility that 
criterion noise can disrupt recognition memory processes. This instantiation of SDT primarily 
contrasts with the classic SDT as outlined above in its assumptions regarding response criterion. 
As mentioned earlier, classic STD (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) 
assumes that criterion variance is non-existent or negligible. In contrast, ND-TSD postulates that 
the response criterion is a random variable allowed to vary from trial to trial (Benjamin et al., 
2009). As a consequence, criterion noise can be introduced into recognition decisions. Criterion 
noise is essentially a memory burden that can result from simply trying to maintain a response 
criterion or by attempting to update a criterion. Regarding the maintenance of response criterion, 
the authors posit that the use of a criterion to make recognition decisions requires that a person 
remember what that criterion value is from trial to trial. In a basic recognition paradigm where 
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people study a single list of words and make simple “old/new” decisions, only a single criterion 
is needed for the entire test and participants must remember to apply that standard of evidence to 
every test item. In contrast, consider the case in which at test participants make recognition 
decisions using a 6 point confidence scale. In order to make recognition decisions in this context, 
participants must establish and use five different criterion values, one for each confidence 
boundary. Because of the additional memory resources needed to maintain and switch between 
multiple criterion values, discriminability performance could be worse in this situation. Thus, 
ND-TSD predicts that having to use and remember multiple criterion values creates criterion 
noise subsequently leading to worse recognition performance (Benjamin et al., 2009).  
Benjamin et al. (2009) aimed to demonstrate that criterion noise contributed significantly 
to recognition decisions by having participants complete an ensemble recognition task and then 
modeling individuals’ response frequencies to evaluate whether their data better fit statistical 
models of discriminability that assume either zero (SDT) or non-zero (ND-TSD) criterion 
variability. In their experiment, participants studied a list of words and took an ensemble 
recognition test in which set size was manipulated. On each test trial, participants were presented 
with one, two, or four items together and asked to make a recognition decision on the entire set 
of items. The items in each ensemble were either all old or all new items. This manipulation of 
set size was intended to allow the authors to separately estimate the unique contribution of 
stimulus and decision noise, where stimulus noise is the uncertainty introduced by the test items 
themselves and decision noise reflects criterion variability. Benjamin et al. reasoned that set size 
should affect stimulus noise but not criterion noise because each ensemble is supposed to be 
evaluated with a single criterion. The results of their model fitting favored ND-TSD over 
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traditional SDT theory, which led the authors to suggest that criterion noise plays a large, 
meaningful role in recognition decisions (Benjamin et al., 2009). 
Benjamin, Tullis, and Lee (2013) have recently provided further evidence in support of 
ND-TSD. In this study, they evaluate the claim of ND-TSD that maintaining a criterion 
introduces noise by manipulating test format. After studying a list of words, participants took a 
recognition test in which they made simple “old/new” decisions, or responded on a 4-point or 8-
point confidence scale. Because making recognition decisions using confidence scale ratings 
requires a participant to maintain multiple confidence criteria, updating these multiple criteria 
should produce more criterion noise. Thus, ND-TSD predicts that discriminability should be 
worse when confidence ratings are used. In line with their predictions, Benjamin et al. (2013) 
found that recognition discriminability was best when participants made “old/new” judgments 
and dropped significantly as more decision points were added. 
With regard to the adjustment or updating of a criterion relevant to the present focus on 
feedback, manipulations attempting to get participants to change their criterion also introduce 
noise into the recognition decision (Benjamin et al., 2009). Again, this is because doing so places 
a non-trivial memory load on the recognizer. Consider the case where participants make 
“old/new” decisions and accuracy feedback is either present or absent. When feedback is not 
given, participants have no basis for updating their criterion and subsequently only have to 
remember a single criterion value that may not change much throughout the test. Conversely, 
when feedback is present, it serves as an external recommendation by which participants attempt 
to adjust their criterion. When a participant responds “old” and is given feedback that her 
decision was wrong, she may adjust the criterion for the next few test items to be slightly more 
conservative. Similarly, when she responds “new” incorrectly, she may adopt a slightly more 
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liberal response criterion. This constant adjustment of a criterion across a test is not only 
cognitively demanding (Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007), but also requires that a participant remember 
the updated criterion value and then use it accordingly. Thus, over the course of a memory test, a 
no-feedback condition only requires participants to remember a singular criterion value, whereas 
a feedback condition prompts participants to adjust and remember new criterion values multiple 
times throughout the course of a test. It may be crucial whether the adjustment of a criterion is 
systematic and helpful, versus random and unhelpful. For example, when feedback is applied to 
encourage people to adjust from a nonoptimal criterion placement to a more optimal one, 
feedback should likely help performance. Indications of this type of help can be seen in the work 
by Titus (1973) and Estes and Maddox (1995), although Kantner and Lindsay’s (2010) second 
experiment also used extreme base rates and found a negative influence of feedback. But when 
people may already be optimal in their spontaneous criterion placement, feedback may cause 
them to adjust in nonoptimal ways, creating noise. The results in other experiments by Kantner 
and Lindsay (2010) and by Hicks and Starns (2014) are consistent with this possibility.  
Although recent evidence has supported ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009, 2013), the 
theory is not without its critics. Kellen, Klauer, and Singmann (2012) re-analyzed the data set 
from Benjamin et al. (2009) and also provided new data from a recognition test in which they 
manipulated their subjects’ responses by having them give either confidence ratings or ranking 
judgments. On confidence rating test trials, participants saw a single test probe and were asked to 
give it a confidence judgment using a 6 point rating scale. For ranking trials, participants were 
shown four test items and, knowing that only one of them was old, asked to rank order each item 
on its probability of being previously studied. This ranking task was supposed to be analogous to 
a forced-choice alternative task whereby participants can make decisions based solely on 
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memory strength without reference to any criterion and thus free of any criterion noise. Kellen et 
al. (2012) argue that the results of their modeling of the recognition data indicate that ND-TSD 
does not provide a substantive account of signal detection over and above classic SDT. For most 
of their sample, criterion variability was estimated to be zero and the amount of variability for 
the few who displayed any at all was negligible. Hence, the authors concluded that ND-TSD 
does not provide a substantive account of recognition memory beyond that of traditional SDT. 
These findings stand in stark contrast to Benjamin et al. (2009) who argued that the presence of 
criterion noise has a substantial impact on recognition performance. 
The Hicks and Starns (2014) work also represents another way in which ND-TSD’s 
predictions have not borne out.  In their work, the finding that color cues indicative of memory 
strength actually lowered discriminability contradicts a particular claim of ND-TSD. According 
to Benjamin et al. (2009), when test items vary on a particular dimension (e.g. memory strength), 
criterion variability is greater when the observer samples test items that have a larger range on 
that dimension. When the testing environment does not readily allow the observer to treat 
distinct classes of test items differently (e.g. strong or weak items), they will sample across the 
entire range of old items, thereby increasing the range for criterion variance as well. However, 
when these classes of items are readily distinguished, as is the case with the color cue 
manipulation, participants should be able to treat these strong and weak items differently and 
thus separately estimate the range of memory strength for weak and strong items. Consequently, 
rather than having large criterion variability across all test items, this separate estimation reduces 
criterion variability (and hence criterion noise) because each class of items has its own amount of 
criterion variability which is smaller than the variability that comes from treating all old items 
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similarly. Thus, ND-TSD predicts that the color marking manipulation of Hicks and Starns 
should actually reduce criterion variability leading to better discriminability.  
Hicks and Starns (2014) reported the opposite result: color marking produced a 
decrement to recognition discriminability. On the surface, this result suggests that the use of 
color marking to adjust one’s criterion may still have created noise. In many other studies, 
information regarding test cues indicating base rates (ex. Van Zandt, 2000; Aminoff et al., 2012) 
or memory strength (ex. Verde & Rotello, 2007; Hicks & Starns, 2014) are given as instructions 
before a testing phase and participants are required to use the cues on their own. That is, they 
must keep particular information or rules in mind about what different cues represent, select the 
appropriate rule for each test item, and then try to use the cue to make a memory decision. 
Because of the extra cognitive effort required to use cues in these situations, criterion noise may 
be more apparent. However, one must also acknowledge that the effect size associated with the 
color marking decrement was small. In addition, Hicks and Starns’ manipulation of color 
marking depended on people noting how the colors differentiated strong from weak items and 
keeping that in mind throughout the test on their own. However, other studies have administered 
test cues in a manner that reduces the cognitive load on participants. For example, Selmeczy & 
Dobbins (2013) provided alerting cues for each test item individually right before its 
presentation. Thus, when the testing environment is highly supportive, such as by giving cues 
individually for each test item (ex. Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013; Bruno, Higham, & Perfect, 
2009), criterion noise may be dramatically reduced. 
Another difficulty in offering criterion noise as a mechanism by which feedback harms 
recognition is that the presence of criterion noise should have noticeable effects on recognition 
performance whenever it is present. However, if criterion noise affects recognition to such a 
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large degree, why do non-significant feedback effects run rampant in the literature? The most 
likely reason is that the effects of criterion noise are slightly more moderate than Benjamin et al. 
(2009) suggest and that the majority of experiments examining feedback in recognition have not 
possessed sufficient statistical power to find significant effects. However, as reviewed earlier, 
notable exceptions to this trend exist in which a significant negative effect of feedback was 
found. Kantner and Lindsay (2010) found a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1992), while Hicks and 
Starns (2014) found a small effect. Regardless, criterion noise does represent a potential 
mechanism for deleterious feedback effects. Moreover, there is a long-standing argumentation in 
the signal detection literature suggesting that feedback may disrupt recognition processes via 
added criterion variability (e.g., Clark & Greenberg, 1971; Schoeffler, 1965). Wickelgren (1968) 
reiterated the importance of considering criteria as having variances that must be considered 
when comparing different recognition test contexts (e.g., “old/new” recognition versus rating 
scales).  
Overview of Current Study 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the idea that accuracy feedback on a recognition test 
is a source of criterion noise. According to ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009), criteria can vary 
from trial to trial and criterion noise is created when criteria are maintained and updated (see also 
Schoeffler, 1965). Traditional SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) 
assumes that criterion variance is zero. Thus, these theories make competing predictions about 
the effect of feedback on recognition discriminability. Specifically, ND-TSD predicts that 
because the aim of feedback is to help participants update their response criterion to optimize 
performance, an ironic consequence is that this constant adjustment of criterion in response to 
the feedback actually hurts performance by introducing criterion noise. In contrast, traditional 
SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) would predict either a null effect of 
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feedback on discriminability because participants are unable to appropriately adjust their 
criterion or that feedback would provide a benefit to recognition performance by allowing 
participants to more optimally set their criterion (assuming they may begin nonoptimally). 
Additionally, the hypothesis that multiple sources of criterion noise can have additive, 
detrimental effects on recognition discriminability is tested here. That is, I assessed whether 
criterion noise can be created with other test manipulations (e.g., rating scales, color cues) and 
whether feedback would further decrease performance beyond these manipulations. 
Additionally, I collected RT data in both experiments to examine whether a negative impact of 
feedback on discriminability might be attributed to a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
In Experiment 1, participants completed a recognition test in which both feedback and the 
length of the rating scale used to make a memory judgment (2 or 8 point) was manipulated. A 
predicted source of criterion noise in recognition is the length of rating scales used to make 
memory decisions (see also Wickelgren, 1968). Benjamin et al. (2013) found worse 
discriminability for tests in which 8 point or 4 point confidence scales were used as compared to 
simple “yes/no” responses. If maintaining multiple criteria creates criterion noise, then trying to 
update and optimize multiple response criteria in response to accuracy feedback could create 
additional criterion noise. RTs were predicted to be slower on the tests with feedback. 
In Experiment 2, I manipulated the presence of feedback and color cues indicative of 
memory strength similar to both Hicks and Starns (2014) and Verde and Rotello (2007). 
However, both of these earlier studies manipulated feedback across experiments whereas here 
feedback is varied within-subjects in the same experiment. Additionally, both of these studies 
presented test items in varying sizes of strength blocks (strong or weak), whereas in this 
experiment test items were randomly presented. Hicks and Starns (2014) do have one condition 
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where test items were presented randomly, but feedback was not compared to a no-feedback 
condition in this random test sequence.  Here, both the feedback and color cues are crossed in a 
factorial design with the hypothesis that presenting test items randomly rather than in blocks 
would increase the likelihood of observing the effects of criterion noise because it would be 
more difficult to maintain and update criteria on an essentially trial by trial basis rather than 
when a block of a particular type of item is encountered. As mentioned earlier, ND-TSD predicts 
that color cues should actually reduce criterion noise (Benjamin et al., 2009). However, based on 
the work of Hicks and Starns (2014) and some pilot data, color cues were hypothesized to 
decrease recognition performance. Reaction times were predicted to be slower in the presence of 
both feedback and color cues. 
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Experiment 1 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-five undergraduate Psychology students from Louisiana State 
University participated in this experiment to fulfill a partial course requirement or for extra 
credit. 
Materials 
Five hundred and sixty unique words with the following characteristics were randomly 
selected from the MRC psycholinguistic database 
(http:www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm): concreteness, familiarity, and 
imageability ratings all between 200 and 600 on scales ranging from 100 to 700, Kučera-Francis 
written frequency between 10 and 800, and word length between five and nine letters. Four sets 
of 140 items were used to create study-test lists in four separate computer programs, all of which 
were created using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  These four 
sets of items were equated for frequency, concreteness, and imageability. For each program, 70 
words were randomly chosen to be studied and the remaining 70 words were used as new items 
at test. This assignment of words to act either as studied targets or new lures at test was 
counterbalanced. Both the presentation of studied and test items was randomized anew for each 
participant. 
Design 
The design was a 2 (feedback: present or absent) × 2 (rating scale length: 2 or 8 point) 
mixed factorial, with feedback manipulated within-subjects and rating scale length manipulated 
between-subjects. 
 
24 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 1-3 people and completed two study-test cycles. For 
the encoding phase, participants were instructed that they would study a list of words for a later 
memory test. The studied words were presented individually for a duration of 2 seconds each 
followed by a blank 250 ms ISI.  Five primacy and recency buffers were included at the 
beginning and end of each study list. Immediately following the study list, participants were 
given instructions for the recognition test. Participants were told that they will be presented with 
a mixture of studied and non-studied words. 
Participants in the 2 point rating scale group were asked to make “old/new” decisions for 
each test item by pressing the “/” key for “old” and the “z” key for “new” responses. For the 
participants in the 8 point rating scale group, each test item appeared on the screen above an 8 
point confidence rating scale ranging from 1 (“sure new”) to 8 (“sure old”). Participants were 
asked to press the appropriate number key on the keyboard that corresponded to their level of 
confidence and were encouraged to use the entire range of responses across the test.  
On tests that included feedback, immediately following each response participants saw a 
screen for 1 second informing them of the status of the word they just judged. If the word they 
just made a response to was an old word, they saw the message “Studied!” appear in green. If the 
word they made a response to was a new word, participants saw the message “Not Studied!” in 
red. For the other recognition test that participants completed, no feedback was given. The order 
in which participants received feedback (first or second test) was counterbalanced across 
subjects. 
 
 
25 
 
Results 
The use of both a 2 and 8 point rating scale presents somewhat of an issue when trying to 
compare recognition discriminability for these groups. The measure da can be calculated when 
there is more than one point in z-ROC space, which is the case for the 8 point but not the 2 point 
(yes/no) scale because there is no slope for a singular point in z-ROC space (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). Thus, da was calculated for both the feedback and no feedback conditions in 
the 8 point scale group and the average slopes derived from these conditions were used to 
calculate da for the 2 point conditions. That is, the slope calculated for the 8 point scale when 
feedback was absent was used as a slope estimate for the 2 point condition in which there was 
also no feedback. The same procedure was used to estimate a slope for the 2 point condition 
when feedback was given from the 8 point rating scale in which feedback was also present. 
Additionally, to ensure that the results were not specific to this particular metric of 
discriminability, Az was also calculated for each participant. In the 8 point condition, da was used 
to calculate Az and in the 2 point condition, d’ was substituted for da (Verde, Macmillan, & 
Rotello, 2006). 
Seven participants were excluded from the analyses because they were at or below 
chance performance in one or both of the recognition tests. Thus, the final sample size for the 
analyses was 118 participants. 
Discriminability 
Discriminability was analyzed by submitting the da measures to a 2 (feedback) × 2 
(response type) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA. Table 2 displays the results below.  
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Table 2. Group recognition data from Experiment 1 with standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was a main effect of feedback such that overall discriminability was lower in the 
feedback condition, F(1, 116) = 29.60, MSE = .128, p < .001, ηp2 = .206. There was a trend for 
feedback to interact with response type, although this was not significant, F(1, 116) = 3.31, p = 
.072, ηp2 = .028. Pairwise comparisons showed that feedback had a somewhat larger negative 
impact in the 2-point condition, t(57) = 4.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .64, than in the 8-point 
condition, t(59) = 2.81, p = .007, Cohen’s d = .36. This result is depicted visually below in 
Figure 3. There was no main effect of test order, F(1, 116) = 1.73, p = .19, or response type, F(1, 
116) < 1, p = .61. Additionally, the interactions between feedback and test order, response type 
and test order, as well as the three-way interaction were not significant, Fs < 1. 
Az measures were also examined with a 2 (feedback) × 2 (response type) × 2 (test order) 
mixed-factorial ANOVA. A significant main effect of feedback was found such that feedback 
lowered discriminability, F(1, 116) = 32.34, MSE = .004, p < .001, ηp2 = .221. However, this 
main effect was qualified by a significant feedback by response type interaction, F(1, 116) = 
9.26, MSE = .004, p = .003, ηp2 = .075. 
 
 2 Point Ratings 8 Point Ratings 
 No Feedback Feedback No Feedback Feedback 
HR .71 (.02) .71 (.01) .72 (.02) .72 (.01) 
FAR .26 (.02) .37 (.02) .28 (.02) .31 (.02) 
da 1.30 (.08) .96 (.07) 1.26 (.08) 1.09 (.06) 
Az .81 (.01) .73 (.01) .79 (.01) .77 (.01) 
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Figure 3. Discriminability measure da in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% CIs as 
recommended by Masson & Loftus (2003) for mixed-factorial designs. 
 
 
Post-hoc tests showed that the negative effect of feedback was larger in the 2-point 
condition, t(57) = 6.08, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .80, than in the 8-point condition, t(59) = 1.83, p = 
.073, Cohen’s d = .24, and this result is shown below in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Discriminability measure Az in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% CIs as 
recommended by Masson & Loftus (2003) for mixed-factorial designs. 
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The main effects of test order, F(1, 116) = 1.34, p = .25, and response type, F(1, 116) = 
.80, p = .37, were both not significant. Again there were no interactions between feedback and 
test order, response type and test order, and the three-way interaction was not significant, Fs < 1. 
Reaction Times 
The group RT data is displayed on the following page in Table 3. Median RTs for hits 
and correct rejections were also examined separately for the 2-point and 8-point conditions with 
2 (feedback) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVAs. Reaction times in the 2-point group were 
initially trimmed if they were faster than 300ms or slower than 2000ms. For the 8-point group, 
RTs faster than 500ms or slower than 4600ms were trimmed prior to analysis1.  
 
Table 3. Average median RTs from Experiment 1 with standard error in parentheses. 
 
For the 2-point condition, there was a tendency for hits to have faster RTs in the feedback 
condition though this was not significant, F(1, 56) = 3.22, p = .08. There was no effect of test 
order, F(1, 56) = .12, p = .73, and the interaction was also not significant, F(1, 56) = 2.63, p = 
.11. For the 8-point condition, there was no effect of feedback or test order on RTs for hits, Fs < 
1. The interaction between feedback and test was significant, F(1, 58) = 19.45, MSE = 60763.57, 
 2 Point 8 Point 
 FB First FB Second FB First FB Second 
 No FB FB No FB FB No FB FB No FB FB 
Hits 
906.28 
(48.60) 
903.25 
(51.50) 
921.42 
(53.92) 
861.44 
(57.13) 
1393.10 
(49.38) 
1606.55 
(52.32) 
1591.29 
(51.05) 
1407.53 
(54.09) 
Correct 
Rejections 
1036.02 
(48.83) 
992.08 
(55.24) 
979.35 
(54.17) 
945.19 
(61.28) 
1510.73 
(49.61) 
1654.39 
(56.13) 
1770.67 
(51.29) 
1564.26 
(58.03) 
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p < .001, ηp2 = .258, indicating that RTs for hits were faster in the no-feedback condition when 
the test with feedback was completed first but that RTs were faster in the feedback condition 
when the test including feedback was completed second. That is, RTs simply got faster across 
the testing session. 
Regarding RTs for correct rejections in the 2-point group, there was an effect of feedback 
such that RTs were faster when feedback was present, F(1, 58) = 5.03, MSE = 8692.32, p = .03, 
ηp2 = .082. Test order did not affect RTs, F(1, 56) = 1.72, p = .20, and the interaction was also 
not significant, F(1, 56) = .08, p = .78. For the 8-point group, there was no main effect of 
feedback on RTs for correct rejections, F(1, 58) = .77, p = .39. Additionally, the main effect of 
test order was not significant, F(1, 58) = .86, p = .36. There was a significant interaction between 
feedback and test order, F(1, 58) = 23.87, MSE = 38463.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .292, indicating that 
RTs were faster on the test without feedback when that test was completed last and RTs were 
faster on the test with feedback when that test was completed last.  
Endnote 
 1   Reaction times were also analyzed by examining log-transformed median values of 
hits and correct rejections. RTs were trimmed at the lower end for the 2 and 8-point groups at 
300 and 500ms, respectively. Slower RTs were trimmed if they were 2.5 SDs above an 
individual’s average RT. This trimming procedure removed only 3% of cases and the subsequent 
analyses yielded the same results as those reported above. 
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Discussion 
To examine whether feedback introduces criterion noise into recognition memory 
decisions, participants completed two study-test cycles in which accuracy feedback was present 
on one test but not the other. Additionally, the type of recognition response was manipulated 
such that participants made either “yes/no” decisions or gave confidence ratings. As predicted, 
there was an overall negative effect of feedback such that discriminability was lower when 
feedback was present. Discriminability was equal between the “yes/no” and confidence ratings 
groups, which is somewhat problematic for ND-TSD as it predicts that memory should be better 
when participants are making simple “yes/no” decisions. Additionally, the ordinal interaction 
between feedback and response is difficult to explain using ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009). 
Feedback lowered discriminability more in the “yes/no” condition than in the confidence ratings 
condition. ND-TSD predicts that feedback might interact with rating scale length, though it 
predicts that feedback should be more harmful to recognition discriminability in the confidence 
ratings condition. As noted earlier, Benjamin et al. (2013) found that longer rating scale length 
was associated with lower recognition discriminability, which they interpreted as indicative of 
criterion noise because making confidence decisions requires the use of multiple criteria. 
However, unlike Benjamin et al. (2013), we manipulated rating scale length between subjects 
rather than within-subjects. Hence, our failure to find that feedback lowers discriminability more 
for rating scale decisions might reflect a couple of possible outcomes: this study lacked sufficient 
statistical power to detect an effect of rating scale length or that the additive effects of different 
sources of criterion noise were small or negligible. A detailed discussion of these possible 
outcomes is deferred to the General Discussion section.  
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Regarding the RT data, there was a very mixed bag of results. Participants in the 2-point 
condition were slightly faster in the feedback condition which replicates Kantner and Lindsay 
(Exp. 2; 2010) who also found slightly faster RTs in a feedback condition, albeit in the context of 
making 6-point confidence ratings. However, RTs in the 8-point group were not impacted much 
by the presence of feedback. Rather, the results indicated that they just got faster as the testing 
session progressed. This also replicates Kantner and Lindsay (Exps. 3 & 4; 2010) who found in 
two of their experiments that feedback had a null effect on RTs but that RTs generally got faster 
across testing blocks. The RT data also speak against a simple speed-accuracy tradeoff in regards 
to why feedback lowers discriminability. For the 2-point group, RTs were only significantly 
faster for correct rejections when feedback was present, whereas we might expect a speed-
accuracy tradeoff to affect both types of correct decisions. Additionally, discriminability was 
lowered by the feedback in the 8-point condition, though not to the same degree as in the 2-point 
condition. Regardless, feedback lowered discriminability in 8-point condition but there were no 
significant RT differences between feedback and no feedback conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Experiment 2 
As mentioned earlier, Verde and Rotello (2007) found numerically worse discriminability 
using a strength manipulation at encoding and by presenting test items in blocks according to 
their strength. Hicks and Starns (2014) found a significant negative effect of feedback on 
discriminability using this procedure and also found that the presence of color cues denoting 
memory strength lowered discriminability. Thus, the aim of this experiment was to assess how 
feedback and color cues indicative of memory strength (i.e. strong or weak) would affect 
recognition discriminability when test items are presented randomly rather than in blocks. 
Because a random test condition requires frequent criterion shifts, I hypothesized that this test 
format would create more criterion noise than a blocked test and hence would allow for the 
potentially negative effects of feedback and color cues to be more readily observable. Both 
feedback and color cues were predicted to lower discriminability and these two variables were 
predicted to have additive negative effects. 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-three undergraduate Psychology students from Louisiana State 
University participated in this experiment to fulfill a partial course requirement or for extra 
credit. 
Materials 
Four hundred unique words with the same properties as the stimuli used in Experiment 1 
were randomly selected from the MCR psycholinguistic database. Four programs were created 
using E-Prime software and 100 words were randomly assigned as stimuli for each of the four 
programs. 
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Design 
The design was a 2 (feedback: present or absent) × 2 (strength: strong or weak targets) × 
2 (color marking: present or absent) × 2 (test order: feedback on first or second test) mixed-
factorial, with feedback and strength manipulated within-subjects and color marking at test and 
test order manipulated between-subjects. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually or in pairs for each experimental session and 
completed two study-test cycles. Participants were told they would study a list of words for a 
later memory test and that some words would be presented multiple times. For the encoding 
procedure, the program randomly selected 40 words from the pool of 100 items, half of which 
were presented four times (strong targets) and half of which were presented only once (weak 
targets). Ten filler items were presented at the beginning and end of each encoding to act as 
primacy and recency buffers. Thus, the encoding phase consisted of 100 presentations which 
were randomized anew for each participant. Words were presented individually for a 700 ms 
immediately followed by a blank 100ms ISI. The remaining 40 words served as lures on the test, 
half of which were assigned to the strong color cue while the remaining 20 were assigned to the 
weak color cue. These lure stimulus assignments were made by the software even when the color 
cue was not provided. This aspect of the procedure is identical that used by Hicks & Starns 
(2014).  
After the encoding phase, participants were immediately given test instructions informing 
them they would take a test composed of studied and non-studied words. For participants in the 
marked condition, they were informed that test items studied four times would be presented in 
red font color, words studied once would be presented in green, and that new test items will 
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appear half in red and half green. For participants in the unmarked condition, all test items were 
presented in black. Participants made an “old” or “new” decision for each test item by pressing 
the “/” and “z” keys, respectively. In both conditions, test items were randomly presented. For 
the programs that included feedback, participants were additionally informed that feedback will 
appear on the test. Specifically, they were told that they would see the message 
“***ERROR***” when they made an incorrect decision. This feedback screen lasted for 1200 
ms. The order in which participants received feedback at test was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
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Results 
Nineteen participants were excluded from the analyses because they were at or below 
chance performance in one or both of the recognition tests. Thus, a final sample size of 104 
participants was used in the analyses. 
Discriminability 
Group recognition data are presented below in Table 4. For each recognition test, HR, 
FAR, and d’ was calculated separately for strong and weak items. 
 
Table 4. Group recognition data from Experiment 2 with standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discriminability was examined by analyzing d’ with a 2 (feedback) × 2 (color marking) × 
2 (strength) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA.  A significant main effect of strength 
indicated that memory was better for strong than weak items, F(1, 102) = 186.60, MSE = .313, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .651. Critically, there was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 102) = 8.00, MSE = .258, 
p = .006, ηp2 = .074, whereby discriminability was lower when feedback was present. The main 
 
Unmarked Marked 
No Feedback Feedback No Feedback Feedback 
Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong 
HR 
.67 
(.02) 
.88 
(.02) 
.67 
(.02) 
.86 
(.01) 
.65 
(.02) 
.87 
(.01) 
.67 
(.02) 
.85 
(.01) 
FAR 
.28 
(.02) 
.27 
(.02) 
.26 
(.02) 
.31 
(.02) 
.28 
(.02) 
.26 
(.02) 
.32 
(.02) 
.27 
(.02) 
d’ 
1.17 
(.09) 
2.04 
(.09) 
1.17 
(.02) 
1.72 
(.10) 
1.10 
(.06) 
1.94 
(.08) 
1.01 
(.08) 
1.79 
(.09) 
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effects of test order, F(1, 102) = 2.28, p = .13, and color marking, F(1, 102) = .94, p = .33, were 
not significant. There was no significant interaction between strength and test order, F(1, 102) = 
.60, p = .44, or between strength and color marking, F(1, 102) = .75, p = .39. However, the there 
was a significant three-way interaction between these variables, F(1, 102) = 7.39, MSE = .313, p 
= .008, ηp2 = .069. When feedback was first, memory for strong items was higher in the 
unmarked (M = 1.99, SE = .10) relative to the marked condition (M = 1.66, SE = .11). However, 
when feedback was second, memory for strong items was higher in the marked (M = 2.04, SE = 
.10) versus the unmarked condition (M = 1.76, SE = .10). 
Feedback did not significantly interact with test order, F(1, 102) = 3.74, p = .056, though 
there was a trend for feedback to lower discriminability more when the test including feedback 
was completed after the test with no feedback. Feedback also did not interact with color marking, 
F(1, 102) = .18, p = .68. However, there was an unexpected interaction between feedback and 
strength, F(1, 102) = 4.00, MSE = .212, p = .049, ηp2 = .038. Post-hoc tests revealed that 
feedback significantly lowered discriminability for strong items, t(103) = 3.50, p = .001, Cohen’s 
d = .34, but not for weak items, t(103) = .70, p = .49, Cohen’s d = .07 (Figure 4). The interaction 
between test order and color marking was also not significant, F(1, 102) = 3.92, p = .051, 
however discriminability was nominally higher in the marked (M = 1.58, SE = .07) versus the 
unmarked (M = 1.51, SE = .08) condition when the test with feedback was completed second  but 
was lower in marked (M = 1.32, SE = .08) versus the unmarked (M = 1.54, SE = .08) condition 
when the test including feedback was completed first. There was no three-way interaction 
between feedback, strength, and test order, F(1, 102) = 2.67, p = .11. Additionally, the three-way 
interaction between feedback, strength, and color marking was also not significant, F(1, 102) = 
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2.37, p = .13. Lastly, the four-way interaction between all variables was not significant, F(1, 102) 
< .001, p = .99. 
Reaction Times 
The group RT data is displayed below in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Average median RTs from Experiment 2 with standard error in parentheses. 
 
Median RTs for hits and correct rejections were separately analyzed for each strength 
condition with a 2 (color marking) × 2 (feedback) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA. RTs 
faster than 300ms or slower than 2000ms were trimmed prior to analysis1. 
Regarding hits for strong items, there was a main effect of feedback such that RTs were 
faster when feedback was absent, F(1, 102) = 32.48, MSE = 8940.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .245. 
 Unmarked Marked 
 FB First FB Second FB First FB Second 
 No FB FB No FB FB No FB FB No FB FB 
Hits         
Strong 
745.96 
(26.17) 
812.85 
(31.91) 
730.18 
(26.69) 
801.18 
(32.54) 
840.02 
(27.24) 
954.75 
(33.21) 
839.86 
(24.78) 
886.88 
(30.21) 
Weak 
836.79 
(37.80) 
896.71 
(35.51) 
798.20 
(38.55) 
879.92 
(36.22) 
897.58 
(39.34) 
1031.25 
(36.97) 
1022.47 
(35.79) 
969.31 
(33.63) 
Correct 
Rejections 
        
Strong 
903.00 
(33.86) 
982.83 
(32.24) 
907.70 
(34.53) 
943.34 
(32.88) 
1045.75 
(35.24) 
1136.10 
(33.56) 
1055.81 
(32.06) 
1010.52 
(30.53) 
Weak 
927.94 
(29.50) 
946.96 
(30.63) 
899.94 
(30.09) 
943.42 
(31.24) 
949.00 
(30.71) 
1081.85 
(31.88) 
1020.48 
(27.93) 
1036.62 
(29.01) 
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Additionally, a main effect of color making revealed that RTs were faster in the unmarked 
condition, F(1, 102) = 17.03, MSE = 35335.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .146. The main effect of test order 
was not significant, F(1, 102) = .83, p = .36. Lastly, none of the interactions was significant: 
feedback × color marking, F(1, 102) = .21, p = .65; feedback × test order, F(1, 102) = 1.46, p = 
.23; marking × test order, F(1, 102) = .15, p = .70; feedback × marking × test order, F(1, 102) = 
1.87, p = .18. 
For weak items, there was a main effect of feedback on hit RTs, indicating that RTs were 
faster when feedback was absent, F(1, 102) = 9.28, MSE = 17199.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .085. A 
main effect of marking was obtained, whereby RTs were faster in the unmarked condition, F(1, 
102) = 15.89, MSE = 52735.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .137. There was no main effect of test order, F(1, 
102) = .004, p = .95. However, test order did interact with feedback, F(1, 102) = 5.12, MSE = 
17199.37, p = .026, ηp2 = .049. When the test with feedback was completed first, RTs were faster 
on the test without feedback but when the test with feedback was completed last there was no 
difference between feedback and no feedback RTs. Additionally, the three way interaction 
between feedback, marking, and test order was significant, F(1, 102) = 8.18, MSE = 17199.37, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .076, whereby in the unmarked condition RTs were always faster when feedback 
was absent but in the marked condition RTs were faster on whichever test (with feedback or 
without feedback) was completed last. There was no significant interaction between feedback 
and marking, F(1, 102) = .70, p = .40, or between marking and test order, F(1, 102) = .86, p = 
.36. 
Moving on to RTs for correct rejections of strong items, there was a main effect of 
feedback, F(1, 102) = 6.23, MSE = 13376.37, p = .014, ηp2 = .059, such that RTs were faster on 
the tests without feedback. There was a significant main effect of marking, F(1, 102) = 19.45, 
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MSE = 43460.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .163, indicating that RTs were faster in the unmarked condition. 
A significant feedback by test order interaction, F(1, 102) = 6.23, MSE = 13376.37, p = .014, ηp2 
= .059, revealed that RTs were faster on the test without feedback when it was completed second 
and that there was no difference in feedback and no feedback RTs when the test with feedback 
was completed second. There was no significant interaction between feedback and marking, F(1, 
102) = 1.20, p = .28, or between marking and test order, F(1, 102) = .49, p = .49. The three way 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 102) = 2.02, p = .16. 
For the RTs of correct rejections of weak items, there was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 
102) = 15.09, MSE = 9588.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .131, indicating that RTs were slower when 
feedback was present. A main effect of color marking revealed that RTs were slower in the 
marked condition, F(1, 102) = 19.45, MSE = 37473.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .106. There was no effect 
of test order, F(1, 102) = .002, p = .96. Feedback did not interact with test order, F(1, 102) = 
2.87, p = .09, nor did it interact with marking, F(1, 102) = 2.52, p = .12. However, the three-way 
interaction between these variables was significant, F(1, 102) = 6.72, MSE = 9588.08, p = .011, 
ηp2 = .063, indicating that RTs in the unmarked group did not vary by test order or feedback but 
in the marked condition RTs were faster when feedback was absent but only when the test 
including feedback was completed first. Lastly, the interaction between color marking and test 
order was not significant, F(1, 102) = .29, p = .59. 
Endnote 
 1   Reaction times were also analyzed by examining log-transformed median values of 
hits and correct rejections. RTs were trimmed if they were faster than 300ms or 2.5 SDs above a 
person’s mean RT. This trimming procedure removed only 3% trials. Subsequent analyses 
resulted in similar results to those above with the exception that for correct rejections, there is no 
main effect of feedback for strong or weak items. 
 
 
40 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, participants completed two recognition tests in which feedback at test 
was either present or absent. Additionally, we manipulated the memory strength of items and the 
presence of color cues at test indicating memory strength (strong or weak). Overall, feedback 
was found to lower discriminability as predicted by ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009). In 
particular, the presence of feedback significantly lowered discriminability for strong items 
whereas discriminability for weak items was relatively unaffected. These results provide mixed 
support for ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) as the theory would predict that feedback should 
lower discriminability via introducing criterion noise into the recognition decision. However, it is 
unclear why feedback for strong items would produce more criterion noise than feedback for 
weak items. Additionally, there was no effect of color cues at test, which is consistent with the 
ND-TSD prediction that giving people a cue to better recognize differences in target distributions 
should reduce criterion noise. The overall result suggests that different, multiple sources of 
criterion noise may not have additive effects, though there was a trend for discriminability to be 
lower in the marked condition relative to the unmarked condition when the test with feedback 
was completed first. However, the nature of this marginally significant interaction was disordinal 
in that participants actually had slightly higher discriminability in the marked condition when the 
test including feedback was completed after the test with no feedback. If color cues are a source 
of criterion noise, then they should be an impediment to discriminability regardless of the test 
order. One potential explanation here is simply that there were practice effects resulting from 
using the color cues on the first test. A more elaborate discussion of these findings is reserved for 
the next section.  
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Regarding RTs, both feedback and marking generally led to longer RTs, suggesting that 
participants were in fact trying to use the color marking and incorporating the feedback. 
Additionally, participant RTs generally got faster across the testing session, which likely reflects 
a practice effect. Taken together, the RT data suggest that the deleterious impact of feedback is 
not simply a speed-accuracy trade off. If this were the case we would have expected feedback to 
speed responses only for strong items since feedback only lowered discriminability for strong 
items, but the results show that feedback speeded responses regardless of strength.  
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General Discussion 
The primary goal of this study was to test the hypothesis that feedback lowers recognition 
discriminability by means of introducing criterion noise into the decision process. According to 
ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) criterion variance is not fixed (i.e. zero) as traditionally 
assumed by SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) but instead can 
randomly vary on each trial. The consequence of this criterion variability is that a strain on 
memory (i.e., discriminability) is experienced when having to maintain a criterion (e.g. Benjamin 
et al., 2013) or when attempting to update that criterion. Thus, two general predictions can be 
derived from ND-TSD: any test manipulation that encourages a person to update or adjust their 
criterion or any circumstance in which a person is required to hold multiple criteria will lower 
recognition discriminability. Corrective feedback given on recognition tests is meant to help 
improve performance by allowing participants to make favorable criterion adjustments, but this 
constant updating of criteria might actually introduce criterion noise and thus lower 
discriminability.  
To investigate the possibility that feedback produces a real and deleterious effect on 
recognition discriminability, feedback was manipulated within-subjects in two experiments in 
which we also manipulated rating scale length (Experiment 1) and memory strength and color 
cues at test indicating strength (Experiment 2). There are four primary results from these 
experiments which are summarized here. First, in both experiments participants’ overall 
discriminability was lower when feedback was present rather than absent at test. Second, 
feedback in Experiment 1 produced a larger negative effect when participants made simple 
“yes/no” decisions to test items as opposed when they made confidence ratings. Third, feedback 
in Experiment 2 produced lower discriminability for strong items but exerted only a negligible 
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effect on weak items. Fourth, the presence of color cues in Experiment 2 indicative of memory 
strength had no effect on discriminability.  
Regarding the first point, this overall negative effect of feedback replicates the work of 
Hicks and Starns (2014) who found feedback lowered discriminability in various blocked test 
conditions when target strength was manipulated. The present results also extended this negative 
effect of feedback to a random test condition in this same strength-based paradigm (cf. 
Experiment 2). In addition, feedback in Experiment 1 generally lowered discriminability 
regardless of response type, although this effect was smaller in the context of confidence ratings. 
The negative influence of feedback is also generally consistent with the effect size estimates 
discussed earlier in Table 1. Thus, no hint of a positive influence of feedback was found 
anywhere in the various conditions of these experiments. When feedback did exert a significant 
influence, it was a negative one.  
Regarding the second point, although the ordinal interaction between feedback and rating 
scale length was not predicted a priori, it is worth speculating about this finding as it has 
implications for ND-TSD. Specifically, this theory predicts that more criterion noise should be 
created as the length of the response rating scale increases (Benjamin et al., 2009; 2013). There 
are several reasons why we might have failed to find this effect of rating scale length. One 
possibility is that because of our between-subjects manipulation of rating scale length, we simply 
lacked statistical power to detect this effect. However, when comparing the 2-point versus the 8-
point conditions collapsed across feedback conditions, discriminability was slightly better for the 
rating scale condition, rather than worse.  Experiment 1’s outcome therefore replicates Lindsay 
and Kantner (Exp. 3, 2011) as well as Koen and Yonelinas (2011) who found no differences in 
discriminability when comparing “yes/no” versus confidence rating decisions. Benjamin et al. 
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(2013) found a small difference between these types of recognition decisions, though they are 
also the only study to manipulate response type within-subjects. So it is possible that the 
influence of response type is so small that it is best studied in a within-subjects context. 
Alternatively it could be that there is only a negligible amount criterion noise introduced into 
recognition decisions when participants make confidence ratings (Kellen et al., 2012). 
Regardless of the interaction produced in Experiment 1, those results suggest that the presence of 
feedback had much more influence on discriminability than did the type of response context. 
Further work should focus on replicating the influence of rating scales versus “yes/no” decisions.  
Another possible interpretation for feedback exhibiting a larger negative effect in the 2-
point versus the 8-point rating decision is that the range in which criterion can vary is smaller in 
the 8-point condition. In the 8-point rating condition, participants are assumed to set a criterion 
for each confidence boundary. One consequence of this might be that the criterion variance for 
any particular level of confidence is artificially restricted in that even when a criterion is variable 
it does not cross the confidence boundary (i.e. criterion) immediately above or below it. Put 
another way, even when criterion variance is present for a given confidence level, say dividing a 
“5” from a “6”, the criterion for that level can only vary within the boundaries of the other 
confidence levels, as opposed to crossing into the boundary between a “4” and “5” or between a 
“6” and “7”. A related idea comes from Mueller and Weidemann (2008) who suggest that for 
each confidence level, criteria can be represented as overlapping normal distributions on an axis 
of perceptual evidence (e.g. memory strength). For a given amount of evidence, there is a high 
probability that the criterion corresponding to that particular level of confidence will be selected, 
though occasionally a criterion is sampled from one of the overlapping criterion distributions. 
Conversely, when a participant makes “yes/no” decisions, they use only a single criterion. In this 
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case, because there are no other levels of confidence, the criterion is free to vary across a larger 
range of memory strength because it never encroaches upon any other decision boundary. 
Admittedly, this explanation is post-hoc and, in its present state, ND-TSD allows for criterion 
variability even across confidence boundaries, in fact predicting more noise in this response 
context (Benjamin et al., 2009). Concerning the effect of color cues indicative of the memory 
strength of test items in Experiment 2, the presence of these cues did not affect discriminability. 
Hicks and Starns (2014) found that these types of test cues lowered discriminability in their 
strength-blocked tests of varying sizes. In contrast, color cues did not have a significant effect on 
discriminability here. This finding replicates Stretch and Wixted (Exp. 3, 1998), though it should 
be noted that in their study and in the present work discriminability was numerically larger in the 
unmarked conditions, in the direction of color marking producing a negative effect. Thus, the 
effect size for this factor is small, as indicated by Hicks and Starns. They found a significant 
effect in statistical comparisons comprised of over 200 participants in each of their first two 
experiments. 
Prior to conducting this study, I collected pilot data in an experiment identical to 
Experiment 2, except that feedback was manipulated between-subjects and color cues were 
manipulated within-subjects (Appendix A). In this pilot study, the presence of color cues 
significantly lowered discriminability whereas there was only a trend for feedback to harm 
discriminability. The contrast between the present work and this pilot data illustrates the point 
that the effects of both feedback and marking are small and often hard to detect depending on the 
type of experimental manipulation used. Again, another reason for the finding that feedback but 
not color cues harm discriminability could be that different sources of criterion noise do not have 
an additive effect. If a random test condition that requires essentially trial-by-trial updating of a 
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response criterion creates more criterion noise than color cues, then the present study may be 
limited in its ability to detect a significant source of criterion noise above and beyond that 
created by a random test condition. However, in the present study there is no manipulation of test 
composition. Thus a direct comparison of discriminability in an unmarked condition between a 
random and blocked test cannot be made here.  
It is important to note that according to ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009), when color 
cues denoting memory strength are provided at test, the amount of criterion noise should actually 
be diminished. Specifically, Benjamin et al. (2009) predicted that when participants can treat 
multiple classes of test items (e.g. weak and strong) differently, criterion variance should be 
reduced. Again, the purpose of presenting the color cues at test is to get participants to treat 
strong and weak test items differently. Thus, the results here do not support one of the explicit 
predictions of ND-TSD. It remains to be seen whether a cleaner manipulation of making people 
aware of strength differences might produce results in line with the ND-TSD prediction. For 
example, one could rely on a more extreme manipulation of strength by adding repetitions to the 
strong items, or perhaps with a more traditional shallow/deep manipulation based on the levels of 
processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  
Unexpectedly, the results from Experiment 2 showed that feedback exerted a negative 
influence on the discriminability of strong but not weak items. In the color marked condition, 
discriminability for weak items was slightly lower in the feedback condition. However, in the 
unmarked condition, discriminability for weak items was identical in both feedback conditions. It 
is rather unclear why feedback would differentially affect strong but not weak items. One 
possibility is that feedback may only have a beneficial, or at least benign, effect on 
discriminability when the recognition decision is particularly difficult to make. That is, when a 
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person is required to make a more fine-grained decision (e.g. discriminating a weak target from a 
lure), feedback may not exert a negative effect because the decision is already moderately noisy. 
Conversely, there may be a smaller amount of pre-existing noise for easier recognition decisions 
(e.g. discriminating a strong target from a lure). Thus, feedback might exert an adverse effect 
only on strong items because it introduces criterion noise into a decision that typically has a low 
amount of noise. This explanation is consistent with the previously suggested idea that there may 
be an upper limit to the amount of noise (criterion noise or stimulus noise) that can impact 
recognition decisions. 
Related Accounts of Criterion Variability 
Although the idea and significance of criterion variability is a relatively recent matter of 
debate for memory researchers, the idea of criterion variance has longstanding roots in the 
psychophysical literature (e.g. Tanner, 1961). For example, Schoeffler (1965) developed an 
intricate model of learning in the context of SDT in which feedback is explicitly considered as a 
factor of interest. According to Schoeffler (1965), when feedback is present at test, subject’s 
knowledge of their performance, particularly when they make an error, will lead them to adjust 
their criterion in order to more appropriately respond on the next trial. However, in the absence 
of feedback, subjects do not adjust their criterion (i.e. criterion variance is zero) and the results of 
his modeling predicts that discriminability should be better when no feedback is present. One 
subtle contrast here with ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) is that ND-TSD posits that criterion 
noise exists even without feedback, as simply using and maintaining a criterion introduces noise. 
Schoeffler’s notion that participants use feedback to adjust their criterion was echoed by Kac 
(1969) who proposed that people will only adjust their criterion in response to error feedback. 
That is, when a person is made aware that they made a correct decision, they have no motivation 
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to adopt a more liberal or conservative criterion However, when informed of an incorrect 
decision, people will adjust slightly in the appropriate direction as to minimize the risk of making 
that error again (i.e. liberal shift for a miss and a conservative shift for a false alarm). However, 
this assumes that observers equally value errors of omission and commission which may not 
always be the case (e.g. payoff manipulations).  
Another theory of criterion variability comes from Mueller and Weidemann (2008) who 
propose a decision noise model (DNM) extension of SDT. The authors make the distinction 
between “stimulus noise” and “decision noise”, with the latter reflecting an analogous concept to 
criterion noise. According to the DNM, decision noise is essentially a mismapping between an 
internal state (e.g. familiarity) and an external response (e.g. confidence rating). Similar to ND-
TSD, the DNM asserts that on a particular test trial, a criterion value is selected from a 
distribution of criteria. Additionally, both of these theories predict that recognition 
discriminability should be better when making “yes/no” decisions versus confidence ratings, 
although the mechanisms by which that happen are different. ND-TSD predicts that 
discriminability is lower for rating scale confidence decisions because each level of confidence 
must be maintained which places a burden on the observer to remember where each criterion 
maps onto varying levels of memory strength (Benjamin et al., 2009). Alternatively, DNM posits 
that discriminability is worse for confidence ratings because some of the criterion distributions 
overlap at any given point of memory strength. That is, for a given familiarity value, an observer 
may sample from multiple overlapping criterion distributions (i.e. confidence levels) which leads 
to suboptimal performance (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008).  
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Summary and Future Directions 
Taken together, the results from both experiments provide an empirical point of departure 
from the extant work on feedback in recognition (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010) in that the data from 
this study indicate that feedback has a real, albeit small, deleterious impact on discriminability. 
The primary basis for re-examining this abundance of null results stemmed from predictions 
based on ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) which asserts that manipulations designed to get 
people to adjust their criterion may create criterion noise which subsequently leads to lower 
discriminability. Although considering feedback as a source of criterion noise is consistent with 
the spirit of ND-TSD theory, feedback was not a factor considered by Benjamin and colleagues 
as a potential source of noise.  Moreover, other results from this study suggest that embracing 
ND-TSD theory in its current state would be premature. For instance, in the first experiment the 
length of the rating scale had no effect on discriminability. One potential way to explore this idea 
would be to manipulate both feedback and rating scale length within-subjects. This should enable 
an effect of rating scale length to emerge, if it exists, and also to observe if an ordinal interaction 
exists between feedback and rating scale length.  
Also, even though color marking in Experiment 2 did not significantly harm recognition 
discriminability, it also did not help performance as predicted by ND-TSD theory. Assuming that 
color marking should produce a negative influence, contrary to the ND-TSD predictions but 
consistent with prior work by Hicks and Starns (2014), in the second experiment there was no 
additive negative effect of feedback and color cues, again indicating that different sources of 
criterion noise may not accumulate. However, the ability to observe this may again be limited by 
the experimental design. In all cases, participants completed a random test which may produce so 
much criterion variance on its own that layering color cues on top of that is essentially a drop in 
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the bucket. This issue could be addressed by also including a condition where participants 
completed a blocked test as in Hicks and Starns (2014). Additionally, ND-TSD does not give an 
account of why there might be more criterion noise for strong versus weak items. 
Future examinations of feedback in recognition might also do well to follow the lead of 
Kellen et al. (2012) who examined criterion noise in a ranking task which the authors assumed to 
be criterion free.  Although the results from the present study provide evidence that feedback has 
a negative impact on recognition discriminability with criterion variance as a proposed 
mechanism, whether or not that decrement reflects criterion noise per se is, admittedly, not an 
entirely resolved issue. Although the current work was motivated by ND-TSD, the primary goal 
here was to examine whether feedback has a genuine, adverse effect on recognition 
discriminability and not necessarily to champion ND-TSD. If it is truly criterion noise that is 
causing an adverse effect of discriminability, that decrement should not exist in a task where 
participants do not typically exhibit bias such as a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task. If 
feedback lowered discriminability on a 2AFC task, those results would be very problematic for 
ND-TSD or for any theory that might propose criterion noise as a source of the negative 
influence of feedback. Alternatively, if feedback does not affect performance in a 2AFC task that 
would provide some indirect evidence that the locus of the decrement is in fact the criterion.  
Conclusions 
In closing, the results from this study provide evidence that recognition discriminability 
can be negatively affected in the presence of feedback. Previously, feedback has been regarded 
as a potential source of advantageous information that should lead to better discriminability. 
Some support was found for ND-TSD which predicts that feedback is a source of criterion noise. 
Additionally, no evidence was found which would suggest that independent sources of criterion 
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noise can have additive effects. Models of memory will need to be able to account for the 
negative effect of feedback at test and current theories which explicitly state that feedback should 
help recognition discriminability (e.g. Turner et al., 2011) will need to consider the results from 
this study in future work. 
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Appendix A: Pilot Experiment Data 
Pilot experiment data wherein color cues were manipulated within-subjects and feedback 
between subjects on a random test. Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
 
 
 
  
 
Unmarked Marked 
No Feedback Feedback No Feedback Feedback 
Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong 
HR 
.69 
(.01) 
.91 
(.01) 
.69 
(.02) 
.89 
(.01) 
.67 
(.02) 
.86 
(.02) 
.66 
(.02) 
.85 
(.02) 
FAR 
.30 
(.02) 
.28 
(.02) 
.31 
(.02) 
.31 
(.02) 
.31 
(.02) 
.33 
(.02) 
.33 
(.02) 
.34 
(.02) 
d’ 
1.15 
(.09) 
2.13 
(.09) 
1.14 
(.09) 
1.91 
(.11) 
1.08 
(.09) 
1.72 
(.10) 
.91 
(.07) 
1.61 
(.11) 
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